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BESHADA v. JOHNS-MANVILLE PRODUCTS
CORP.: REVOLUTION-OR ABERRATION-IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
ANDREW T. BERRY*
INTRODUCTION
The elusive concept of design defect in strict products liability,I as it
was interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.,2 was recently examined in these
pages. 3 In Beshada, the court held that defendants that sold asbestos
products without warning of the products' dangers would be liable
even though those dangers were "undiscoverable" at the time the
products were marketed. 4 This result, including the court's rejection
of the "state-of-the-art" defense,5 was characterized in this journal as
* McCarter & English, New Jersey; A.B. 1962, Princeton University; LL.B.
1965, Harvard University. Mr. Berry argued for certain appellees in Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
1. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 181, 463 A.2d 298, 304
(1983); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 600-02 (1980);
Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cum. L.
Rev. 293, 297-98 (1979); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-
Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 297, 304-05 (1977);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 831-32
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade I].
2. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
3. Placitella & Darnell, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Evolution
or Revolution in Strict Products Liability?, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 801 (1983).
4. 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 541.
5. Id. at 204-05, 447 A.2d at 546-47. The state-of-the-art defense relieves a
manufacturer of liability if, under the scientific or technological standards existing at
the time of sale, the dangers of a product were neither known nor "knowable" when
the product was marketed. See 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability
§ 16A[4][i], at 3B-176 to -176.4 (1983). In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted what
most would have regarded as the most expansive definition of state-of-the-art: indus-
try standards plus other alternatives within scientific or technological limits at the
time of distribution. Id. at 172, 406 A.2d at 151. Other authorities have adopted
different definitions of state of the art, ranging from industry custom alone, to
knowledge possessed by anyone at the time. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of
State of the Art Evidence In Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 4-5
(1982); see Note, Product Liability Reform Proposal: The State of the Art Defense, 43
Alb. L. Rev. 941, 945-53 (1979); Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to
Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71 Geo. L.J. 1635, 1635 n.2
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Undiscoverable Product Defects].
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merely a well-reasoned "logical extension" of accepted principles of
strict liability in tort.6
This Article suggests that Beshada, perhaps for case-specific rea-
sons, was an unprecedented departure from prior products liability
cases. In fact, the departure was sufficiently sharp to cause one of its
two academic progenitors7 to reject its logic," and its judicial authors
to restrict its holding. 9 This Article examines the prospects for the
continued vitality of Beshada by reviewing the products liability law
background from which it emerged, factors related to the case itself,
the analysis relied on by the court, and the academic and judicial
response to date. It concludes that Beshada can and should be limited
to its unique factual situation.
I. THE BACKGROUND
By 1982, when Beshada was argued, the stream of products liability
law in New Jersey had wound its way from the wellspring of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,'0 down through the main chan-
nels of Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.," Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Machine Co.,12 and Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc. 13
The latter group of cases all dealt with the slippery notion of design
defect liability.14
6. Placitella & Darnell, supra note 3, at 806-07.
7. See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-75, 386 A.2d 816,
825-27 (1978) (citing Keeton, supra note 1; Wade I, supra note 1), overruled, Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
8. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 734, 758-59 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Wade II].
Dean Keeton has yet to write his views on Beshada.
9. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183-84, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983).
See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
10. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), overruled, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
12. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
13. 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981). For a review of the historical development
of New Jersey strict products liability law, see Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J.
130, 146-52, 305 A.2d 412, 421-24 (1973).
14. The conceptual difficulties arise because the standard against which a defec-
tively designed product is measured is more elusive than in the case of a manufactur-
ing defect. Compare Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 1962)
(design defective if defendant should have expected plaintiff would remove safety
guard or if guard would not have prevented injury) and Suter, 81 N.J. at 171, 406
A.2d at 150 (design defective if defendant failed to act in reasonably prudent manner
in designing product) with Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824 (manufacturing
defect exists if product as produced did not conform to product as intended). In a
manufacturing defect case, the standard against which liability is measured is the
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In Cepeda, the New Jersey Supreme Court, casting about for a
standard against which to measure the concept of design defects in
strict products liability, adopted the "risk-utility" or "Wade-Keeton"
analysis. 15 Accepting Dean Wade's seven-factor threshold test, 6 the
court approved a model jury instruction charging that a product is
defective ("not duly safe") if it is "so likely to be harmful ... that a
reasonable prudent manufacturer ... would not place it on the mar-
ket."' ' 7 The court did not address the time-related issue of scientific or
technological feasibility but the product's "dangerous propensity...
manifested at the trial [was] imputed to the manufacturer" in an
attempt to establish an objective standard of foreseeability.18
The next year, in Suter, the court characterized the Cepeda holding
as extending strict products liability "to include not only intended but
also reasonably foreseeable uses of the product."' 9 To avoid potential
jury confusion, the court excised the "unreasonably dangerous" modi-
fier of "defective condition" found in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts20 and held that the jury should determine only if "the product
was reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or foreseeable
purposes when inserted by defendant into the stream of commerce." 2 1
manufacturer's own designs and specifications. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J.
169, 181, 463 A.2d 298, 304 (1983). Failure to meet the standard proves the defect.
Id. In contrast, design defect theory-attacking the judgment of the manufacturer in
placing the product on the market as designed-does not provide a measuring
standard and thus creates ambiguities in application. See id.; Birnbaum, supra note
1, at 599-600; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 367-68 (1965); Wade, On Product Design Defects
and Their Actionability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 551, 557 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Wade III].
15. 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825.
16. Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827. Dean Wade suggests that a court consider,
among other things: "(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain
its utility .... (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance." Wade I, supra
note 1, at 837-38.
17. 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 827 (quoting Wade I, supra note 1, at 839-40).
18. Id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825. The court's failure to deal clearly with the
potential passage-of-time difficulties inherent in the imputed knowledge analysis
could not have been inadvertent. Judge Conford, the Presiding Judge of the New
Jersey Appellate Division who was temporarily assigned to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, authored the opinion. He was a member of the American Law Institute while
working on the opinion and, in May of 1977, had a discussion with Deans Wade and
Keeton concerning the kind of knowledge that could be imputed to a defendant.
Wade II, supra note 8, at 763.
19. 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979).
20. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Cepeda had held that this
language was a part of the strict liability test. 76 N.J. at 171-72, 386 A.2d at 825. To
this extent, Cepeda was overruled by Suter. 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
21. 81 N.J. at 176, 406 A.2d at 153.
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Moreover, in design defect cases, the jury should determine if the
manufacturer, "being deemed to have known of the harmful propen-
sity of the product, acted as a reasonably prudent one."22 The court
had earlier alluded to elements bearing on the issue of reasonable
prudence, including:
[T]he technological feasibility of manufacturing a product whose
design would have prevented or avoided the accident, given the
known state of the art .... [T]he state of the art refers not only to
the common practice and standards in the industry but also to
other design alternatives within practical and technological limits
at the time of distribution.23
Thus, the court apparently intended the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's conduct, measured by what it could have done or known at
the time of distribution, to be the standard for determining if a
product is defective. Suter, however, did not draw a bright line
between "conduct" and "product."
Rather than the conduct-oriented test found in Cepeda24 and Su-
ter,25 the court in Freund applied a product-oriented test to a product
that was defective because of an inadequate warning. 26 The court
stated that the charge to the jury "must make clear that knowledge of
the dangerous trait of the product is imputed to the manufacturer. 27
The court, however, was not presented with, and hence did not
consider, exactly what knowledge was to be imputed-that discov-
ered by the time of trial, or that available at the time of manufac-
ture.28 The court also noted that "where the design defect consists of
22. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
23. Id. at 172, 406 A.2d at 150-51 (emphasis added).
24. Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 174-75, 386 A.2d at 827.
25. Suter, 81 N.J. at 172, 406 A.2d at 150-51.
26. 87 N.J. 229, 239-241, 432 A.2d 925, 929-31 (1981). Justice Handler, writing
for the court, eschewed the principle that cases ought to be decided on narrow
grounds when possible. Id. at 243-44, 432 A.2d at 931-32. The plaintiff was injured
by nitrocellulose, which, at the time of its sale, was known by the defendant to pose a
risk of fire. Id. at 235, 432 A.2d at 928. This risk was acknowledged and admitted by
the defendant at trial. Id. at 242-44, 432 A.2d at 932. That admission, as a matter of
law, should have removed from the jury's consideration the issue of defendant's
knowledge of the danger, and should have relieved the plaintiff of the burden of
proving knowledge. Justice Handler could have reversed the verdict for the defense
on that issue alone, and certainly could have -reversed on that issue in part, thus
permitting a characterization of much of his analysis as dictum.
27. Id. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
28. The cases relied upon by the court to support its product-oriented imputed
knowledge approach involved dangers and risks known by the manufacturer, and
thus did not implicate a "scientific unknowability" defense. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir. 1974) (highly flammable
paint that the manufacturer admitted was "hazardous if not properly used under
proper conditions"); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 386, 549 P.2d 1099,
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inadequate warning" the product's utility balanced against its risks is
rarely at issue because a warning would not impair the product's
utility.29 As with the earlier cases, the court relied upon the seminal
analysis of design defects in strict products liability law contained in
the writings of Deans Keeton and Wade.
30
While the New Jersey Supreme Court wrestled with the meaning of
design defect in different contexts, it left intact the seemingly unexcep-
tionable principles that a manufacturer is not the insurer of the safety
of the product, 31 that the happening of an accident, without more,
does not result in liability, 32 and that defendants would bear the
burden of exculpating their product or conduct only in special, limited
cases. 33 Against this background of legal principles and policies, Be-
shada began its journey to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
1109 (1976) (birth control pill; defendant deemed on notice from published medical
literature); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Iowa 1978)
(power saw); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Ky. 1976)
(abrasive wheel on portable grinding machine; recognized in industry that excessive
speed would result in the disintegration of wheel); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co.,
269 Or. 485, 497, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038-39 (1974) (manufacturer knew of potential for
injury caused by regurgitation of fibreboard from sanding machine); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp, 462 Pa. 83, 92, 337 A.2d 893, 897-98 (1975) (rotor decay
during climbing flight; recognized by manufacturer as danger associated with prod-
uct use). In Aller, the defendants' knowledge "as of the time of the manufacture of
the product" was the test used by the court. 268 N.W.2d at 837. In Phillips, the
relevant test was whether the manufacturer knew of the danger "at the time the
article was sold." 269 Or. at 494, 525 P.2d at 1037.
Although Freund was an inadequate warning case, the court ignored that part of
the Restatement that specifically establishes the seller's obligation to warn of dangers
"if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j
(1965). Between Cepeda and Suter, the court had denied certification in Torsiello v.
Whitehall Labs., 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132 (App. Div. 1978), certif. denied,
81 N.J. 50, 404 A.2d 1150 (1979), which had relied on this comment in a prescription
drug products liability context. Id. at 319-20, 398 A.2d at 136.
29. Freund, 87 N.J. at 242, 432 A.2d at 932. As to the consequences of this
observation, see infra note 49.
30. 87 N.J. at 239, 432 A.2d 930 (citing Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy
of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398 (1980); Wade II, supra note 8).
31. Traynor, supra note 14, at 366-67; Wade I, supra note 1, at 828.
32. See Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J. Super. 582, 587, 246 A.2d 478, 480 (App.
Div. 1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 270, 250 A.2d 135 (1969).
33. See Nopco Chem. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 59 N.J. 274, 284-85, 281 A.2d 793,
798-99 (1971); Anderson v. Somberg I, 134 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6, 338 A.2d 35, 37 (App.
Div. 1973), aff'd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). These
cases shifted the ordinary burden of proving the cause of the accident because the
defendants were in a significantly better position to identify the cause. Namm v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 31-32, 427 A.2d 1121, 1127 (App. Div.
1981). This was not a factor in Beshada because the plaintiffs knew as well as the
defendants the potential product hazards as they existed at the time of trial.
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II. Beshada: ITS PECULIAR FACTS AND THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Beshada is understood best not as a products liability case, but as an
asbestos case. Thousands of such cases had been filed in state and
federal courts throughout the country, 34 and hundreds were pending
in the state courts of New Jersey.35 At the time of the Beshada deci-
sion, a single trial judge had been specially assigned to hear all asbes-
tos cases in the venue in which most of these cases in New Jersey were
pending.36 The attention the litigation had received from the media
was significant, much of it sensational and almost all of it critical of
the defendants. 37 Finally, an early, oft-cited asbestos case contained a
harshly worded characterization of the asbestos defendants' liability. 38
The lead complaint in Beshada, although pleading strict liability as
a legal theory, specifically alleged that the defendants "knew or ought
to have known" of the dangers of their asbestos products but had
failed to warn the plaintiffs. 39 The plaintiffs thus assumed the burden
of proof conventionally thought to be theirs under the Restatement.
40
Despite this, the plaintiffs in six consolidated cases, relying on Freund,
moved for partial summary judgment on the state-of-the-art de-
fense. 41 Although a state-of-the-art defense did not appear as a sepa-
rate affirmative defense in the defendants' pleadings, the plaintiffs'
characterization of their motion was the formulation ultimately ac-
cepted by the court.42 The defendants opposed the motion on the
34. Nat'l L.J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 1, col. 1, 30, col. 1 (approximately 17,000
personal injury suits filed in connection with exposure to asbestos).
35. Committee on Civil Case Mgmt. & Procedures on Toxic Tort Litigation, N.J.
Admin. Office of the Courts, Report of the Working Group on Asbestos Litigation 5
(Draft Nov. 1983) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Working Group on Asbestos Litigation].
36. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 198, 447 A.2d at 543.
37. See, e.g, The Asbestos Peril, Newsweek, May 8, 1978, at 66; Asbestos: A
Lethal Legacy, Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 10, 1980, at IF, col. 4; Firms Using
Asbestos Knew of its Dangers, Congressman Asserts, Wall St. J., May 3, 1979, at 10,
col. 2; New Data on Asbestos Indicate Cover-up of Effects on Workers, Wash. Post,
Nov. 12, 1978, at Al, col. 5; Asbestos Industry Accused of Conspiring to Suppress
Warning of Health Hazards, L.A. Times, June 28, 1978, at 8, col. 1; You Can't Put a
Price on Life, Charlotte Observer, Feb. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Asbestos Absorption in
People: The Long Range Effects, ABC Nightline, Nov. 9, 1981 (Radio-TV Monitor-
ing Service, Inc.) (available in files of Fordham Law Review); See You in Court, CBS
Reports, July 9, 1980, at 9-11.
38. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1104 (5th Cir. 1973)
(en bane) (calling warnings, when finally affixed to products in 1964, "black hu-
mor"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
39. Fifth Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 8, Beshada v. Johns-Man-
ville Prods. Corp., No. L-12930-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 19, 1979).
40. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (1965).
41. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 198, 447 A.2d at 543.
42. See id. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543.
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grounds that Freund should not apply to dangers unknowable at the
time of distribution of the product, and that the motion was prema-
ture.
43
Inasmuch as the factual record had been neither developed nor
argued, the trial court regarded the motion as involving a question of
law rather than fact.44 Attempting to reconcile the conflicting strains
in Suter and Freund in a manner that would apply throughout prod-
ucts liability law-not just asbestos cases-the trial judge denied the
plaintiffs' motion and observed that the concept of knowledge at the
time of manufacture is not conduct-oriented, but objective: "[W]hat-
ever was known at the time of manufacture is imputed [to the manu-
facturer] . ''4 The trial court thus found that knowledge of the prod-
uct's hazards, as they were known at the time of manufacture, would
be presumed, relieving the plaintiffs of the burden of going forward
on the issue. 46 The defendants, however, would be permitted to rebut
the presumption by showing the product's hazards were unknowable
at the time of manufacture. 47 Plaintiffs' application to the New Jersey
Appellate Division for leave to appeal the trial court's interlocutory
43. Transcript of Motion to Strike State of the Art Defense at 37-39, Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., No. L-12930-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 9,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Transcript of Motion]. The defendants also pointed out
that the defense involved evidence that would be relevant to plaintiffs' negligence
and punitive damage claims. See id. at 39. In fact, plaintiffs in the Beshada case had
prepared and served expert reports specifically addressing the knowledge available to
the defendants at various points in time. It was not that plaintiffs were unable or
unprepared to prove what defendants knew and when they knew it; instead, they
declined that burden to preclude defendants' introduction of evidence that defend-
ants did not know and could not have known of the dangers at the relevant times.
44. Transcript of Motion, supra note 43, at 51.
45. Id. at 53. The trial judge correctly read Freund and Suter to eliminate the
reasonably prudent Tibetan monk defense. If the knowledge of a product's dangerous
propensities exists and is generally available-which may be different from generally
known, and which is almost certainly different from that known by the hypothetical
monk-the reasonableness of a manufacturer in not acquiring the knowledge is not a
defense. Furthermore, there will be little distinction between "could have known"
and "should have known" in most instances because manufacturers are held to the
standard of experts. 1 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 7.01[4], at
118.6(3)-.7.
46. Transcript of Motion, supra note 43, at 60-61.
47. Id at 54-55. On rebuttal, of course, plaintiffs could have controverted the
defendants' assertions of "unknowability," using the same evidence they had already
prepared for their case-in-chief. In reaching this burden shifting result, the trial
judge may have been influenced by Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). That case required the defendant, once plaintiff
established that the product's design proximately caused the injury, to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the utility of the product outweighed its risks. Id.
at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
[Vol. 52
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order was denied, but leave to appeal was granted by the supreme
court.
48
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied primarily on a policy analysis
in rejecting the use of the state-of-the-art defense in failure to warn
cases based on strict liability. 49 The court, in reaching its conclusion,
identified and analyzed three policies underlying strict products liabil-
ity: risk spreading, accident avoidance, and simplification of the fact-
finding process.50
The court advanced only one affirmative reason for using the risk-
spreading rationale to extend liability for unknowable dangers to
manufacturers-the "normative premise" that the cost of injuries
should be spread among those who produce, distribute and purchase
manufactured products instead of imposing it on "innocent victims
who suffer illnesses."' This analysis has the virtue of simplicity, but
simpler is not necessarily better when the interrelationship between
economics and tort law is made even more complex by the peculiar
time-related aspects of the case. When the time of trial is decades after
the production of the product in question and knowledge of the risks is
48. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 199, 447 A.2d at 543. Although there was no record
below except the pleadings and the trial court's opinion, the standards for permitting
an interlocutory appeal, N.J. Ct. R. 2:12-4, apparently were met by the need to
provide guidance for the trial courts handling the hundreds of pending cases.
49. 90 N.J. at 205-09, 447 A.2d at 547-48. In undertaking this analysis, the court
assumed that "a warning can generally be added without diminishing utility." Id. at
201 n.5, 447 A.2d at 545 n.5. If that is true, strict liability may have become absolute
liability in the failure to warn context. Any warning of an unknown risk that a
manufacturer might include with its product would, of necessity, be vague. Such a
warning may be considered inadequate to warn of the risk and ineffective in protect-
ing the manufacturer from liability. See Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp.
159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Mahr v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 562, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (1979); Baker v. St. Agnes
Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406-07, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (1979); Seley v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981). On the other hand, if such
warnings were deemed adequate, all products that might involve an unknown risk
would carry warnings. Any particular and precise warning against serious and
known risks therefore would become less effective. See McCarthy, Robinson, Finne-
gan & Taylor, Warnings on Consumer Products: Objective Criteria for Their Use, 26
Proc. of Human Factors Soc'y 98, 100 (1982); Slovic, The Psychology of Protective
Behavior, 10 J. Safety Research 58, 61-64 (1978). Furthermore, a warning might
indirectly impair the utility of a product because an effective warning could only be
given after research or the passage of time-both potentially costly-revealed pre-
cisely what to say. See Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super.
418, 432-34, 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (1973) (per curiam).
50. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 205-07, 447 A.2d at 547-48.
51. Id. at 205-06, 447 A.2d at 547. The court also reasoned that if risk spreading
is acceptable for unknown risks, it ought to be equally acceptable for unknowable
risks. Id. at 206, 447 A.2d at 547. This reasoning, however, ignores the substantial
overlap between known and knowable in the ordinary case. See supra note 45.
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not available until the time of trial,5 2 risk spreading as articulated in
the earlier New Jersey cases may not work at all. If the product is no
longer marketed at the time of trial, the loss cannot be spread through
an increase in the product's price. This presents two possibilities:
Losses may be spread by increasing the price of products wholly
unrelated to those causing injury to pay for increased insurance premi-
ums, reserves, settlements and judgments;5 3 or the price of products
sold in the past may have been raised in anticipation of some indefi-
nite, unknowable contingent obligation that might arise at a future
point from losses not susceptible of estimation at the time of manufac-
ture. Both alternatives produce inefficient pricing policies.5 4 Although
the underwriting principles relating to casualty insurance risks are
bound to have a measure of imprecision when insuring against losses
from defectively designed products, 55 that imprecision is compounded
if manufacturers must insure against unknowable risks that may not
become apparent for many years.5
The court also incorrectly used a two-party model-the manufac-
turers and the plaintiffs-for its rudimentary risk-spreading analy-
52. Many insulation manufacturers, including some of the defendants in Be-
shada, had substituted other materials for asbestos a number of years prior to trial.
See I. Selikoff & D. Lee, Asbestos and Disease 464-67 (1978). At least one defendant
in Beshada had been out of the insulation business for nearly a quarter of a century at
the time of trial. Brief of Defendant-Respondent Owens-Illinois, Inc. at 15, Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
53. Comment, Solving the Products Liability Insurance Crisis: A Study of the
Role of Economic Theory in the Legislative Reform Process, 31 Mercer L. Rev. 755,
765 (1980). Assuming an inelastic demand, the prices of the new products will be
raised so the present consumers of useful products with no risk of harm will pay
higher prices to cover losses from asbestos products sold in the 1940s. Alternatively, if
demand is elastic, people may refrain from using a safe, efficient product.
54. The court's "normative" premise really focuses on moral judgments, not
economic ones, and thus implicates questions of the proper distribution of wealth.
Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really A Difference in Law or
Economics?, 8 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 259, 271-73 (1978). Thus, the blameless
customers or blameless owners of a blameless company operated decades ago by
blameless managers will transfer money to blameless users of the company's prod-
ucts.
55. See J. Kolb & S. Ross, Product Safety and Liability 302-03 (1980); Schweig,
Three Models of Products Liability Underwriting, 3 J. Prods. Liab. 161 (1979).
The effectiveness of the asbestos defendants' risk spreading through insurance is in
dispute nearly everywhere because many of the defendants are or have been involved
in litigation with their insurers. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667
F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Porter v. American
Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980),
aff'd on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
56. See Schweig, supra note 55, at 168 (possibility of claims arising from prior
products was cited by almost 22 % of surveyed underwriters as rationale for refusing
to provide coverage). This problem is complicated further by the nature of business
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sis. 57 Fifty-seven of the fifty-nine plaintiffs who joined in the summary
judgment motion, however, were employed by three large companies
and alleged their exposure to the asbestos products occurred at the
companies' plants. 8 Inasmuch as plaintiffs' illnesses arose out of and
in the course of their employment, the first method of loss spreading is
the workers compensation system.5 By ignoring this legislatively cre-
ated compensation system, as well as the risk-bearing potential of the
plaintiffs' employers, 60 the court's two-party model results in a risk-
sharing rationale that does not reflect economic reality.
The patent inadequacy of the court's strict liability risk-spreading
analysis was compounded because the court ignored the substantial
inefficiencies of the tort system as a means for shifting and transfer-
ring losses. "' This failure is particularly acute with respect to the
asbestos cases.A2 A risk-spreading mechanism that includes a substan-
tial factor for high transactional costs is bound to produce an econom-
insurance. Large deductibles, self-insured retentions, and retrospective premium
adjustments all have the effect of transferring accident-compensation costs to future
periods when loss is incurred, instead of the years when the product causing the loss
was sold. See J. Kolb & S. Ross, supra note 55, at 307. Under generally accepted
accounting principles, businesses at the time of sale cannot establish reserves for
unknown, uncertain and unquantifiable future losses. Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5: Accounting for
Contingencies 8, 26 (1976).
57. See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 205-06, 447 A.2d at 547.
58. Id. at 197-98, 447 A.2d at 543.
59. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:15-1 to -127 (West 1959 & Supp. 1983-1984).
60. Eighteen of the plaintiffs were even employed by a regulated utility. Be-
shada, 90 N.J. at 197, 447 A.2d at 543. Assuming a relatively inelastic demand for
electricity, the losses sustained by the utility from paying those it exposed to the
dangerous product may be spread across all users of electricity because the utility is
guaranteed a fair rate of return under the public utilities law. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
48:2-21 to -21.2 (West 1969).
61. See R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 242
(1965); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.16, at 153-54 (2d ed. 1977).
62. The best estimate indicates that it presently costs the parties $2.71 to deliver
$1.00 in net benefits to the typical asbestos plaintiff. J. Kakalik, R. Ebener, W.
Felstiner & M. Shanley, Rand Inst. for Civil Justice, Costs of Asbestos Litigation viii
(July 1983) (prepublication manuscript) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
This estimate, however, ignores the substantial indirect costs of judges, jurors, court-
houses, and the like. This is not to suggest that products liability claims should be
eliminated from the tort system. Economic justification for new rules of liability
producing more instances of loss transfer, however, should take into account the costs
that reduce net benefits to victims and society. As courts move further away from
fault and other morally based determinants of decisions, they have an obligation to
recognize and deal forthrightly with the "enormous complexity of the economic and
jurisprudential issues involved" in risk spreading and accident avoidance. Birnbaum,
supra note 1, at 596-97 n.18.
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ically less efficient result than risk spreading with low transactional
Costs. 
63
The court's accident-avoidance analysis assumed that imposing lia-
bility for failure to discover safety hazards would increase incentives
for industry to invest in safety research, thus leading to fewer acci-
dents.6 4 There are at least two, albeit contradictory, reasons why the
court's assumption may be incorrect. First, manufacturers may be
conducting research and development at a high level as a matter of
economic strategy and competition rather than to avoid potential
liability. 65 Second, if a manufacturer is liable for product hazards of
which it could not have known, safety research might become static.
No matter what the manufacturer learns about potential product
hazards, it will continue to be liable for hazards of which it does not
and cannot learn. Indeed, unless one posits an unusual case like
Beshada, which involved a considerable passage of time during which
63. Worker's compensation should have lower transactional costs than the tort
system. Interagency Task Force on Prod. Liab., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Product
Liability: Insurance Study 4-73 to -74 (1977). The need to lower transactional costs is
a principal argument advanced in favor of no-fault automobile insurance. See R.
Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 61, at 3.
As to the plantworker-plaintiffs, their employers provide not only the conditions
under which the plaintiffs work, but determine the risk incident to that work, and
afford plaintiffs the benefits of group life, accident, health and disability insurance.
The potential losses to groups of plaintiffs working under the same conditions could
be as efficiently estimated as the unknowable risks of products used in that work-
place. But because the employers are subrogated to plaintiffs' claims against the
product manufacturer, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-40 (1959), yet another layer of
inefficiency is added to an already malfunctioning system. Coupled with a rule of
strict (absolute) liability, subrogation may also decrease accident-avoidance incen-
tives. See R. Posner, supra note 61, § 6.11, at 138-39.
64. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548. The court did not suggest any
authority, much less any empirical data, to support the proposition, and there may
be "no basis for choosing between strict liability and negligence with reference to
[the] goal" of accident prevention. R. Posner, supra note 61, § 6.11, at 141.
65. Concededly, the economic theory relating to research and development is
complex. See Elliot, Advertising and R&D Investments in the Wealth-Maximizing
Firm, 35 J. Econ. & Bus. 389 (1983). In addition to competition goals, safety
research and development may be pursued in response to regulatory considerations,
rather than potential tort liability. See J. Kolb & S. Ross, supra note 55, at 1-6;
Monsanto's "Early Warning" System, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 107.
With research and development already responsive to profit and regulatory factors,
manufacturers may choose to purchase insurance or self-insure, with the potential
inefficiencies discussed supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text, rather than engage
in additional research and development. The latter choice, of course, would not
avoid accidents. Undiscoverable Product Defects, supra note 5, at 1651-52. Because
the "could have known" standard usually should be only slightly different from the
"should have known" standard, see supra note 45, any impetus for additional re-
search and development to be gained by eliminating that slight difference is at best
conjectural.
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any single manufacturer's or industry's control over research and
development became highly attenuated, a manufacturer might even
restrict research that could prove the existence of a hazard from
previously manufactured products in order to minimize potential tort
liability. 66 Furthermore, a perfect accident-avoiding manufacturer
would delay introduction of a new product until all possible informa-
tion about that product had been obtained, which, by definition,
would never occur.6 7
The court also suggested that eliminating the state-of-the-art de-
fense would simplify the fact-finding process and save it from "vast
confusion. '"6 This observation is at odds with the customary reliance
upon expert testimony to establish defects in products liability cases. 69
Moreover, in asbestos cases, the supposed simplification of issues is
often nothing more than a fond hope. 70 Many cases include claims for
punitive damages7l that require the jury to consider conduct-oriented
evidence even if the principal claim is based on strict liability.72
66. If a manufacturer remedies such a hazard to protect against future liability,
the remedy may prove to be a double-edged sword. Although subsequent remedial
measures typically are not admissible to prove responsibility, Fed. R. Evid. 407; N.J.
R. Evid. 51, they are admissible to prove feasibility of a new design because the risk-
utility analysis implicates feasibility. See Note, Products Liability-Strict Liability in
Tort-State-of-the-Art Defense Inapplicable in Design Defect Cases-Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), 13 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 625, 630 (1983) [hereinafter cited as State-of-the-Art Defense]. The remedy,
therefore, may be used by plaintiffs to establish a defect due to failure to warn under
Beshada.
67. The accident-avoidance rationale stands a substantial chance of keeping
beneficial and useful products off the market because subsequently discovered haz-
ards may create unmanageable liabilities. See Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 583, 597-99, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 878-880 (1983).
68. 90 N.J. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
69. See Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation
of Judicial Power, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 47, 53 (1977); Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in
Complex Litigation, 20 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 329, 355 (1978). Beshada does not
eliminate the need for expert testimony. Even in a 20/20 hindsight case, in which the
knowledge existing at the time of trial is imputed to the defendant, experts must
testify as to what the manufacturer reasonably should know at the time of trial. Such
an expert will take up no more time and money than if testifying as to what the
defendant manufacturer could have known at the time of manufacture.
70. Asbestos cases retain difficult issues of medical causation and product identi-
fication even after Beshada. See Working Group on Asbestos Litigation, supra note
35, at 9-10. The causation and disease issues by themselves are sufficiently complex to
make asbestos litigation "more like roulette than jurisprudence." Blue v. Johns-
Manville Corp., No. 4001(127), slip op. at 25-26 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Civ. Div. Oct. 12,
1983) (citing two nearly identical cases in which one plaintiff received $15,000 while
a less sick plaintiff received $1,200,000).
71. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982); Neal
v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Seltzer, Punitive
Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency
and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 39 (1983).
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The court's reluctance to have the jury decide complex issues is a
departure from the established view of the jury's proper role.73 The
suggestion that potential jury confusion is a basis for enunciating a
new rule of tort liability is therefore suspect. Jurors may well be
preferable to judges in tort cases74 -fixing tort liability certainly re-
quires "the imposition of sanctions" involving the jury as "a sort of ad
hoc parliament convened from the citizenry at large to lend respecta-
bility and authority to the process. 75
III. THE RESPONSE TO Beshada
The suggested bases for the court's holding lack convincing support
in both precedent and practicality; thus, the response to the decision
understandably has been unenthusiastic. As noted by its defenders in
this journal, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Beshada has
indeed been subjected to "close scrutiny by courts and commenta-
tors. '76 Commentators' reactions have been nearly uniformly nega-
tive, ranging from the prompt, concise and critical, 77 through the
longer but still critical, 78 and finally to the authoritative, critical
72. Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 840 (3d Cir. 1983); Neal v. Carey
Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 812-14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384-85 (1981); Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corps., No. A-2430-81T2, slip op. at 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Jan. 31, 1984); Note, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.: Adding Uncertainty
to Injury, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 982, 1015 (1983). Alternatively, punitive damages can
be tried separately, but that may be more inefficient than trying the different counts
concurrently. This must be added to the theoretical increase in claims thought to
occur from plaintiffs' increased propensity to sue and decreased propensity to settle,
because prevailing on a strict liability claim is relatively likely. R. Posner, supra note
61, at 441-42. Asbestos cases are not settled easily: "The traditional practice of the
settling of cases ... prior to protracted and costly litigation has broken down in
asbestos litigation." Working Group on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 35, at 12; see
Judicial Administration Working Group on Asbestos Litig., Nat'l Center for State
Cts., Final Report With Recommendations 13 (review draft June 1983) (available in
files of Fordham Law Review).
73. See In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,015, at 91,559 (D. Kan. 1977); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v.
International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 227-28 (N.D. InI. 1977); Sanzari v.
Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 141-43, 167 A.2d 625, 632-33 (1961).
74. See Higginbotham, supra note 69, at 53-54.
75. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir.
1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). "Juries should ... continue to resolve the issue of
scientific discoverability in strict liability cases." Undiscoverable Product Defects,
supra note 5, at 1653.
76. Placitella & Darnell, supra note 3, at 814.
77. Birnbaum & Wrubel, N.J. High Court Blazes New Path in Holding a Mlanu-
facturer Liable, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 1; Platt & Platt, Moving from
Strict to "Absolute" Liability, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 18, col. 3.
78. Funston, The "Failure to Warn" Defect in Strict Products Liability: A Para-
digmatic Approach to "State of the Art" Evidence and "Scientific Knowability," Ins.
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response of Dean Wade. 79 Initial criticism focused on the inherent
contradiction in holding a manufacturer liable for selling an unsafe
product although knowledge of the dangers was not available, while
simultaneously defining a defective product as one not made safe "to
the greatest extent possible."80 The court's decision also was criticized
for imposing absolute liability on manufacturers. 8'
The most telling criticism, however, has come from Dean Wade,
upon whom the court in Beshada relied. 2 Dean Wade has expanded
on the argument unsuccessfully advanced by appellees in Beshada:8
3
the inability to distinguish-either on logical or policy grounds-
between the risks inherent in products lacking a safety feature not
technologically feasible at the time of manufacture, and products
lacking a warning of dangers not technologically knowable at the time
of manufacture.
The technological feasibility of making the product safer by elimi-
nating or minimizing certain known hazards depends on discover-
ing or inventing a workable means of adapting the present product
design. But if that way is known at the time of trial, it must have
existed at all times, even though it was not discovered until after
the product was marketed....
[T]here is no basis for drawing a distinction [between these]
knowledge issues. If feasibility ... [is] to be determined as of the
time of manufacture, as virtually all courts hold, so should un-
knowable dangers. 84
Couns. J. 39, 49 (1984) (Beshada court "blundered from their own jurisprudential
quagmire into [the] swamp [of epistemology]"); Undiscoverable Product Defects,
supra note 5, at 1653 ("broad generalities with little or no factual support"); State-of-
the-Art Defense, supra note 66, at 635 ("logically unsound").
79. Wade II, supra note 8.
80. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 77, at 24, col. 2.
81. See id.; Platt & Platt, supra note 77, at 18, col. 3; State-of-the-Art Defense,
supra note 66, at 642. This is true if Freund was correct and a warning always
reduces risk without impairing utility. See Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 87 N.J.
229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981). But see supra note 49 (warning may
impair utility). Assuming Beshada is correct, no-warning trials will often be reduced
to questions of proximate cause. Recovery will be based merely on the plaintiff's
showing that an injury resulted from use of a product that carried no warning of its
potential dangers. If Beshada is given this broad reading, it indeed may impose
absolute liability rather like that imposed for abnormally dangerous activities. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519-524A (1965).
82. See 90 N.J. at 200, 201 n.4, 447 A.2d at 544, 545 n.4.
83. Brief on Behalf of the Johns-Manville Defendants at 19-20, 37-38, Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Brief in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9, Beshada.
84. Wade II, supra note 8, at 759.
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Dean Wade points out that the standard is not the subjective knowl-
edge of the manufacturer, but "the state of human knowledge in
general ... an objective test. 85 This standard, of course, was the one
suggested by the Beshada trial court. 86
Outside of New Jersey, Beshada has received a mixed judicial recep-
tion. Two trial courts have followed Beshada in asbestos cases,8 7 but
the first state supreme court to consider the decision rejected it.8s
Within New Jersey, Beshada was promptly cited for the proposition
that a defendant could be held strictly liable for products defectively
designed by virtue of inadequate warnings, 89 and was applied by the
Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey in a case involv-
ing the state-of-the-art defense. 90
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. Perhaps, as Dean Wade
observes, Beshada "involves a strained effort to create an unreasonable distinction
between strict liability and negligence." Wade II, supra note 8, at 756.
87. Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Tex. 1983);
Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 80-0608, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1982).
Carter found that Texas would reject Beshada in a failure to warn case because a
manufacturer has a duty to warn only of "dangers that the exercise of reasonable
foresight would have revealed." 557 F. Supp. at 1319, On the other hand, the Carter
court, without citing Beshada, also held that the manufacturer could not defend a
defectively designed product on the basis of dangers unforeseeable at the time of
marketing, and would have to establish instead that the "technological capability" to
include a warning did not then exist. Id. at 1320-21.
88. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983).
In recent years, some courts have held manufacturers liable for defects
which, at the time of sale, were "scientifically unknowable." See, e.g.,
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202-09, 447 A.2d
539, 545-49 (1982). By imposing what amounts to "absolute" liability upon
manufacturers, such judicial decisions sever the traditional connection be-
tween tort liability and fault. To hold Ford Motor Company to today's
standard of scientific knowledge when determining liability for an injury
caused by a Model T bought in 1921 appears to us to be clearly unreasona-
ble.
Id. at 298-99. Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court was construing a
recently enacted statute providing for a state-of-the-art defense, N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 507-D:4 (1983), it found Beshada to be inconsistent with its own pre-statute
decisions and those of many of "our sister states." Id. at 299.
Subsequently, in Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 460 N.E.2d - (1984), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts cited Beshada in dictum for the proposition
that fault, and therefore state-of-the-art, are irrelevant in a strict products liability
inadequate warning case. Id. at 413, 460 N.E.2d at -.
89. Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 402, 451 A.2d 179,
187 (1982) (not involving state-of-the-art defense).
90. Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D.N.J. 1982). The
court refused to grant plaintiffs' motion to preclude defendant's introduction of lack
of knowledge, noting that plaintiffs' claims of negligence and reckless misconduct
implicated the reasonableness of defendant's behavior. See id. This illustrates the
neat dilemma facing plaintiffs under a pure application of the Beshada rule. If they
try a case including negligence and punitive damage claims by introducing evidence
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Then, in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,91 the New Jersey Appel-
late Division, at the direction of the supreme court, reconsidered in
light of Beshada its affirmance of a verdict for a prescription drug
manufacturer.9 2 The lower court refused to apply the Beshada rule to
prescription drugs:
In areas involving public health there are weighty policy consid-
erations on both sides of any question as to whether strict liability
should be applied .... Admittedly, Beshada speaks in broad
terms, but absent a direct expression that prescription drug-type
cases are no longer to be separately treated we do not, nor can we,
regard Beshada as effecting a policy change of such dimension.9 3
The Feldman rationale is equally valid for products other than medi-
cines that have substantial social utility.9 4 The court's policy analysis
and judicial restraint,s therefore, may merely be the first of a number
of exceptions that could ultimately swallow the general rule of Be-
shada.
In 1983, the New Jersey Supreme Court in O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp."8 reconsidered the state-of-the-art defense in a case involving a
swimming pool allegedly defectively designed. The court, while giv-
ing lip service to the product-oriented approach, 97 acknowledged that
the risk-utility analysis implicates the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct and, therefore, "strict liability law continues to mani-
fest that part of its heritage attributable to the law of negligence."98
The court's delicate retreat from Beshada9 9 culminated in a much-
of defendants' alleged knowledge and disregard of the hazards to whihh the plaintiffs
were exposed, the defendant will be permitted to introduce exculpatory evidence,
including scientific and technical unknowability. On the other hand, if plaintiffs try
a case in which the worst that can be said about defendants is that they did not warn
in the 1940's of dangers not scientifically established until the 1960's, they cannot
prove an essential element of a negligence claim and may increase the risk of an
adverse verdict on all claims.
91. 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (App. Div. 1983), cert. granted, 94 N.J.
594 (1983). Feldman was argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court on January
10, 1984. Letter from Stephen W. Townsend, Clerk, N.J. Sup. Ct., to John L.
McGoldrick, McCarter & English (Jan. 3, 1984) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review.
92. 189 N.J. Super. at 426, 460 A.2d at 204.
93. Id. at 434, 460 A.2d at 208-09. The court properly relied on Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965), but also found support for its holding in
comment j to that section. 189 N.J. Super. at 435, 460 A.2d at 209.
94. For example, high temperature asbestos insulation that saves a sailor from
steam-line burns aboard a naval vessel may well be as useful as an ointment that
cures a sailor burned by contact with uninsulated steam-lines.
95. 189 N.J. Super. at 434-36, 460 A.2d at 208-10.
96. 94 N.J. 169, 178, 463 A.2d 298, 302 (1983).
97. Id. at 180, 463 A.2d at 303-04.
98. Id. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304.
99. The court stated: "[T]he risk side of the equation may involve, among other
factors, risks that the manufacturer knew or should have known would be posed by
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restricted definition of Beshada's significance: "Although state-of-the-
art evidence may be dispositive on the facts of a particular case, it does
not constitute an absolute defense apart from risk-utility analysis."'100
The court apparently adopted the burden-shifting analysis em-
ployed by the trial judge in Beshada,1'0 requiring a defendant who
wishes to justify marketing a product to prove compliance with the
state of the art. 0 2 Thus, the unresolved tension between Suter and
Freund returns in a slightly different context: Under what circum-
stances will a manufacturer, defending its product against claims of
defective design, be permitted to introduce evidence of scientific or
technological infeasibility at the time of manufacture?10 3
the product, as well as the adequacy of any warnings." Id. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305.
This is the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j
(1965).
100. 94 N.J. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added) (citing Beshada, 90 N.J. at
202-05 & n.6, 447 A.2d at 545-47 & n.6).
101. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
102. O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 183, 463 A.2d at 305. The court also indicated that state-
of-the-art evidence "may support a judgment for a defendant." Id. at 184, 463 A.2d
at 305. Concededly, the defendant did not suggest the existence of hazards that were
unknowable at the time the swimming pool was sold. The facts of the case, however,
presented the court with an opportunity to distinguish the state-of-the-art issue in
failure to warn cases from that issue in other design defect cases. The inference is that
no such distinction was intended by the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the kind of
evidence held inadmissible in Beshada was expressly held admissible in O'Brien.
The majority's retreat from Beshada may have been spurred by Justice Schreiber's
and Justice Clifford's "thinly-disguised discomfort with Beshada" and its "exotic
theory." Id. at 189, 463 A.2d at 308 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford
suggests that O'Brien and Beshada may be irreconcilable because Beshada "fore-
closed the use of state-of-the-art as a defense to a design-defect-warning case," while
O'Brien "could scarcely be more unambiguous in pointing out that state-of-the-art
evidence . . . may be relevant on the central issue of defect and that it may, in
certain instances, support a judgment for defendant." Id.
O'Brien does not share Beshada's reluctance to let a jury decide design defect
issues. Indeed, it suggests that the jury may perform the risk-utility analysis. Com-
pare id. at 184-85, 463 A.2d at 306 (jury competent to undertake risk-utility analysis)
with Beshada, 94 N.J. at 186-87, 447 A.2d at 548 (jury unlikely to be competent to
resolve complex issues). The difference may be the result of a change in the composi-
tion of the court. Justice Schreiber, who approved the state-of-the-art defense in
Suter, and Justice Clifford recused themselves in Beshada but returned for O'Brien.
Justice Pashman, who wrote for the court in Beshada, retired before O'Brien.
103. Seeking to make sense out of Beshada and O'Brien, the Beshada trial court
subsequently gave a two-pronged charge on design defect. On risk-utility the jury
was told:
[T]he nature of the injury that could have been anticipated . . . [and]
evidence . . . of. . . the existing level of technological expertise and scien-
tific knowledge relevant to the asbestos injury at the various times that this
product was designed and sold [have] some relevance on the utility risk
analysis .... It may or may not have bearing on whether the manufac-
turer knew or should have known that risks would be posed by the use of the
product .... [T]he Defendant's compliance with the technology and scien-
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CONCLUSION
Without empirical support, Beshada carried the policy-based rea-
sons for strict products liability beyond previously established limits.
There has been relatively little time since the decision to assess-with
hindsight-the accuracy or consequences of this reasoning. The aca-
demic doubts and the judicial restrictions that quickly followed, how-
ever, may have rightfully consigned Beshada to a relatively limited
significance in strict liability. 104
Excessive adherence to the doctrinal purity of a product-oriented
approach in design defect failure-to-warn cases leads to anomalous
results: A manufacturer that could not eliminate a manufacturing
defect because of the scientific limitations of manufacturing processes
existing at the time of sale can escape liability, while a manufacturer
that could not eliminate a design defect by warning of its risks because
of the inadequacy of scientific knowledge existing at the time of sale
cannot. O'Brien suggests that this anomaly eventually will be re-
solved, perforce by a limited reading of Beshada that recognizes the
continuing vitality of objective state-of-the-art evidence to provide an
appropriate standard against which a claim of design defect can be
measured.
tific knowledge as of the date of manufacture ... doesn't constitute an
absolute defense .... [T]he burden is on the Defendant to prove that
compliance with technology and scientific knowledge as of the date of
manufacture... justifies placing the product on the market.
Transcript of Charge at 31-33, Dall'Ava v. Porter-Hayden Co., No. L-70930-79 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 6, 1983) (emphasis added). As to warnings, however, the
same jury was told:
[T]he law imposes upon the manufacturer and seller, knowledge of the
dangers [sic] propensities of its product. The Plaintiff does not have to prove
that the seller knew or should have known that asbestos can cause injury
and the Defendant cannot defend by saying that it lacked knowledge of the
product's potential to cause harm.
Id. at 36. The trial court's adherence to the seemingly contradictory teachings of
Beshada and O'Brien is impressive, but the confusion between knowledge of risks at
the time of manufacture and knowledge of risks imputed by law must strain even the
most diligent jury's capacity.
104. If Beshada stands for the proposition that state of the art is not a complete
defense, see supra note 100, it adds very little to the analogous principle, established
over 50 years ago, that industry custom is not a complete defense. Cf. The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
